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Islam by smartphone: the changing shape of Uyghur religiosity 
Rachel Harris (SOAS, University of London) and Aziz Isa (independent scholar)  
 
Over the past few years, since the 2009 violence in Urumchi, localised violent incidents have 
become commonplace, often culminating in deaths of so-called Uyghur ‘terrorists’ at the 
hands of the security forces. What is the cause of this ongoing bloodshed? In the wake of the 
2009 violence, the government seemed to promise a gentler approach to social problems in 
Xinjiang, but this policy – if it was ever implemented – was short-lived, and by 2011 ever-
tightening controls on religious practice and belief had become the norm. Since this ‘anti-
religious extremism’ campaign began, many of the incidents reported in Chinese media as 
‘terrorist’ related, appeared according to credible investigations by RFA, to have been 
sparked by intrusive policing, and particularly by the practice of house-to-house checks on 
women’s veiling. 
 
Since 2013, some of these violent incidents have apparently begun to take on the form of 
Islamic jihadi attacks that the Chinese government has so enthusiastically trumpeted to the 
world since 2001. Thus we saw the Kunming train station knife attacks in March 2014 and 
the Urumchi market attack in May 2014. A week after this attack, the government announced 
a one year strike hard campaign, which has seen numerous arrests, executions, and extra-
judicial killings by the police, public relay of punishments reminiscent of the Cultural 
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Revolution period, and a particular push to crack down on the use of social media to spread 
Islamic extremism or any form of anti-government content. A brief but extraordinary 
flowering of religious discussions, images, videos, especially carried on the Weixin (in 
Uyghur: Ündidar) social media platform, was brought to an abrupt end in mid-2014 by this 
crackdown. 
 
The anti-extremism campaign included peasant art competitions – wonderful if disturbing 
imagery reminiscent of Cultural Revolution Art. Other education initiatives include local 
officials organizing collective shaving competitions and “lifting the veil” beauty projects, 
compulsory daily dancing sessions for peasants, and the extraordinary public spectacle of 
imams dancing to the hit Chinese pop song and Internet meme Little Apple. All these state 
initiatives, and state views on the situation, are relatively easily observed from outside China, 
but - because access to this region for scholars is not easy - what we are lacking is a sense of 
the debates going on within Uyghur society about religion and politics and identity, a sense of 
what it is to be a Muslim in Xinjiang today. This paper attempts to give some sense of this 
rapidly changing discourse – as it is revealed through a form of social media: Weixin 
(WeChat). It asks: to what extent has this situation been brought about – as the government 
media claims – by the spread of Islamic jihadi ideals via social media?  Or does the rise in 
religiosity reflect a widespread belief – as some Uyghur intellectuals are now arguing – that 
only through Islam can Uyghurs preserve their identity in the face of Chinese repression and 
assimilationist policies? What kinds of Islamic ideas and sentiments were actually circulating 
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amongst Uyghurs in 2013-2014, and how does this discourse relate to the endemic violence 
that now plagues the region?1  
 
Social media platforms 
The last few years have seen exponential growth in smartphone users across China. Less than 
3 years ago, in January 2011, the Chinese IT giant Tencent launched the smartphone app 
Weixin (WeChat in English). By 2013 it had become the media of choice for some 600 
million users worldwide, 500 million of them within China. Amongst Uyghur users too, 
Weixin, or Ündidar as it is known in Uyghur, became an essential communication tool. From 
mid-2013 to mid-2014, possibly several million Uyghurs inside Xinjiang and in the diaspora 
were using this app, often several times a day, to chat with their friends and to participate in 
online groups or circles, sharing short audio messages, text, images, links, audio and video 
files. All this communication proceeded for over a year with apparently little control or 
surveillance, until the state apparently caught up with the new technology and implemented a 
crackdown in summer 2014.  
 
During this period we actively participated in these social media networks, and it was largely 
through the medium of Ündidar – though also linked to other media platforms including 
Facebook, YouTube, Youku (优酷), Tudou (土豆) and individual blogs – that we observed a 
steady rise in the circulation of Islamic images, audio-video files, audio messages and 
discussion. The speed of the spread of this new discourse, and the increasing radicalisation of 
some of the content was remarkable and disturbing.  
                                                          
1 Audio files discussed in this article can be accessed on the website for the Leverhulme Research 
project ‘Sounding Islam in China’: http://www.soundislamchina.org/?p=1222. 
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This paper takes as its subject the sounds and images and conversations that were exchanged 
on Ündidar between 2013 and 2014. In order to give a sense of the range of ideas, we will 
profile six individual users and one circle (朋友卷), selected from a network of over 200 
people. The six individuals represent different age groups and gender, and various 
educational levels. They include business people, teachers, and manual workers, who come 
from different parts of the Uyghur region. Through this material, we consider the following 
questions: why are Uyghurs turning to Islam in such large numbers. What kinds of Islamic 
ideologies are being promoted via social media? Are they related to transnational flows of 
Islamic media, or are they particular to Uyghur society? Drawing on work by anthropologist 
Charles Hirschkind (2012), what ‘structures of feeling’ do they express? How can a close 
listening to these media items help us to understand the social and political reasons 
underlying the rise of this kind of discourse? 
 
We can think about Ündidar (the social media platform as it is deployed by the Uyghur 
community of users) as a type of ‘technoculture’: a term coined by Lysloff & Gay to refer to 
‘communities and forms of cultural practice that have emerged in response to changing media 
and information technologies’ (Lysloff & Gay 2003: 2). As they argue: ‘technologies become 
imbedded in cultural systems and social institutions, which, in turn, are reconfigured by those 
same technologies’ (Lysloff & Gay 2003: 27). The Weixin platform provides particular 
‘affordances’ for the creation of community, specific to its capabilities as a media platform. It 
offers a choice between one-to-one messaging, closed circles, and posting to all friends. 
People can share text messages, images including their own photos, links, and emoticons. 
They can record and share their own audio messages and videos. Thus it is a flexible platform 
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– it ranges between the intimate (especially in its capability for voice messaging) and public – 
and arguably a democratic platform, in that it supports local production, encourages 
grassroots voices and creativity. 
 
A focus on small media can also help us to understand individual and local realities. Media 
platforms like this provide situated agency, allowing users to creatively engage with the 
challenges of daily life, to explore questions of faith and identity, and find ways of dealing 
with political realities. As Dorothea Schulz argues:  
 
Small media – whose circulation is not centrally controlled or directed – stretch the 
boundaries of the audience and introduce new senses of community, so that locality is 
defined by circulation (Schulz 2006).  
 
Forms of small media like this are also crucial to our understanding of the creation, 
transmission and mediation of religious knowledge on a global scale, and the symbolic and 
political geographies of Islam. 
 
‘What’s Up?’ Individual Profiles 
Among our selection of six individuals, the only one who is not embracing Islam online is the 
oldest (F), a 54 year old, Urumchi-based wealthy business woman who posts mainly in 
Chinese. Instead, she shares texts messages and images complaining about the social 
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pressures now being brought to bear on Uyghur women in Urumchi to adopt the veil (Leibold 
& Grose forthcoming). 
 
Fig. 1. ‘I am the only woman without a veil’ 
 
The two other women in our sample are both members of a circle owned by a Uyghur woman 
based in the US. Just over half of the members of this circle are women. It includes people 
from Kashgar, Urumchi, Ghulja, Beijing, Guangzhou, Saudi, Turkey, Dubai, US, Europe, 
Kazakhstan, Guangzhou. These are highly educated, wealthy people. Most of them are 
religious, but they are careful; religious discussion and materials are very limited. They are 
involved in raising money for the poor and sick in southern Xinjiang, and frequently share 
quite gruesome images of injured or sick people, with phone numbers or even bank account 
details for contributions. 
 
Fig. 2. Circle 朋友卷  
 
One group member (D), is a highly educated woman in her 30s who posts in four languages. 
On just one day, she posts a children’s poem in Uyghur Latinic script; a short text in Chinese: 
‘The darker the road, the brighter the light’, and another in the Uyghur Arabic script: 
‘Ramadan, don’t end. I wish for my sins to be taken away. Please take my sins away with 
you’. This last post is accompanied by an image bearing the Arabic word: ‘Allah’. 
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Fig. 3 Allah 
 
These women exchange intimate personal audio messages with their circles, which reference 
obliquely the ongoing violence and police controls. In late May 2014, after the Urumchi 
market attack, D posts an audio message: ‘every time I go to work it seems like everyone is 
looking at me like I am the enemy. You can’t condemn a whole nation for the actions of a 
few’. Another circle member (E), a mother and teacher in her 40s from Kashgar, posts images 
and short texts which promote idealised images of Islamic womanhood and notions of piety 
and self-restraint. This kind of post is very common amongst female users, and recalls Saba 
Mahmood’s discussions of the cultivation of Islamic sensibilities amongst Egyptian women’s 
sermon groups. 
 
Fig. 4. A perfect woman 
 
Our first male profiled individual (C) is a small businessman originally from the South of the 
region, now based in Urumchi. He also posts daily religious images and sayings.  
 
Fig. 4. Allah is One 
 
Much less cautious than the educated women who work in government posts, several of his 
posts directly reference the political situation, often in satirical ways. One poem entitled 
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‘They’ll arrest you’ (tutiwalidu), sets up a satirical opposition between Islamic morality and 
the current security measures being enforced in Xinjiang.  
 
Fig 5. They’ll Arrest You 
Don’t put odd things on your phone or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t put odd things on your computer or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t tell the truth or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t keep books or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t grow a beard or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t ask people to do good deeds or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t stop people doing wrong or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t spend money for good deeds or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t meet with the families of arrested people or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t carry veiled women in your car or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t pray in public or they’ll arrest you 
Don’t listen to the recited Qur’an or they’ll arrest you 
There are too many things you can be arrested for  
Just don’t do what they don’t like  
Good and bad things are all in their hands  
 
Now listen to the good news  
Drink alcohol and you will not be arrested  
Smoke and you will not be arrested 
Visit prostitutes and you will not be arrested  
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Be corrupt and you will not be arrested  
Cheat and you will not be arrested 
Ignore your parents and you will not be arrested 
Wear fashionable clothes and you will not be arrested  
Praise them and you will not be arrested 
Because they give you these opportunities  
Report people who attend Islamic school and they will be arrested  
Because they will offer you heaven  
Be careful or you will spend your life in a dark cell eating steamed buns  
 
A word from the hadith as a gift  
If Allah gives you ill fortune in your destiny  
All humanity cannot take that bad thing from you  
If Allah gives you one good deed  
All humanity cannot take that away from you  
So be careful or they will arrest you. 
 
Sound, experience, and community 
Some of the most interesting and disturbing material is to be found in audio files and links 
shared by a labourer in his early 20s from the rural south (A). Many of the ways that religious 
experiences and ideologies are shared are not text-based – often the most powerful mediated 
religious experiences come through images and sound. Charles Hirschkind (2012), writing on 
sermon audition on YouTube argues that the forms of religious imagery and vocal 
performance accessed by Muslims on the internet shape new forms of religious sociality and 
impact upon religious structures of affect. Dorothea Schulz, writing on charismatic sheikhs in 
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Mali, West Africa, focuses our attention on sound, arguing that media technologies that 
privilege the experience of sound, address and simultaneously create communities of joint 
spiritual experience.  
 
The specific capacities of particular media technologies to translate religious 
experience come out clearly in the ways many listeners comment on their listening 
experiences. For instance, they often liken the swiftness and immediacy of the sound of 
the spoken word to the sense of being bound tightly together and to the intimate 
atmosphere they experience during collective worship. (Schulz 2006: 220)  
 
Some of the items he shares display a strongly nationalist form of Islam. One, a link shared in 
June 2013, is an audio file of a Uyghur language sermon delivered by a youthful, educated 
male voice. The recording is heavy with reverb, a recording style that indexes radical Islamic 
sermons from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan (Frishkopf 2009). This sermon was definitely not 
recorded in a Xinjiang mosque. It links the nation’s oppression at the hands of an atheist 
Communist regime directly to a national failure to follow ‘correct’ Islamic practice. The 
speaker’s primary target in terms of ‘incorrect’ practice is Sufism. The problem of women’s 
modesty is also a key feature in the list of failures of the Uyghur nation. 
 
Sermon (Tebligh)2 
                                                          
2 The audio file can be accessed here: 
http://www.soundislamchina.org/av/Jihad_tablikh.mp3.  
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… If any nation abandons Allah, he will abandon them. The families who abandon 
Allah will never receive help, but Satan will follow them. If you are wasteful 
(israpkhor), invaders will come to you and make you slaves, enemies will come and kill 
you. There will be rumours (pitni - pasat), and no decency in society, only prostitution, 
drinking, gambling, songs and music everywhere, and will bind the whole nation in 
chains. They will burn in hell after they day. If you believe, Allah will give you courage; 
he will make you fly in the sky. If he wishes, he will bring the flood and destroy you, 
just like the tsunami in Malaysia, or like the hurricanes in America.  
 
If great Allah wishes, if people don’t follow his way, he will bring an oppressive 
regime upon you, just as the Uyghurs now suffer. If people forget Allah, he can punish 
them in this life, and open the doors of hell. On the Day of Judgement Allah will open 
the doors of hell to the nation who forgets him. Allah will punish the nation who does 
not follow him. If he likes you then he will tell you that he is punishing you. If he does 
not love you then he will not tell you, and you will not understand you are being 
punished, just like us. We are under Allah’s punishment now. We are like slaves under 
the oppressive (zalim) Communist regime. When will this nation wake up and open its 
eyes and hold the holy book in their hands, and restore their decency? When will they 
have hope (wijdan)? When will our girls protect their modesty (ipet numus)? Only then 
will great Allah will give our nation victory.  
 
Allah said, if you are a good Muslim, he will give you everything you want. He 
promises you victory. Allah cannot easily change a nation’s fate, but they oppress 
themselves. Even though there is a right way to believe, we followed feudalism, Sufism 
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and dervishes, and did not follow proper Islam. And so we brought this on ourselves, 
and Allah is punishing us today. He made those oppressive, disgusting, inhuman rulers 
to control us. If Uyghur Muslims do not stand up against them and expel them from our 
holy land, then this atheist regime will destroy our religion and drive us from our 
motherland. They will take away our consciousness, our pride, everything; everything 
that we badly need now… 
 
Other items suggest a very different kind of Islam. Another link shared by A, titled ‘ghost 
sermon’, linked to an hour-long audio file, which had been accessed by over 280,000 users. It 
is an amateur, mobile phone recording of a group of young men who appear to be visiting a 
holy woman, a village bakhshi who seems to have the reputation of having met with the spirit 
of a prophet. The men can first be heard approaching her and asking for religious instruction. 
She scolds them in a high-pitched, increasingly excited voice. The men respond to her highly 
charged preaching with emotional exclamations:  
 
Ghost Sermon (Jin Tebligh)3 
You are simple-minded! You can never understand this. Allah only gives this to a few 
people. There is a hadith about it. You are so stupid. How can you ask if I met a prophet 
or not? Do you have faith? …  How dare you ask this? … When Allah likes someone he 
gives that chance to them. How can I reveal this to you? … Ask forgiveness from Allah. 
You are close to being an unbeliever (kapir) …  
                                                          
3 The audio file can be accessed here: http://www.soundislamchina.org/av/Jin_tablikh.mp3. 
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I will tell you one miracle. That girl over there is Hayrinisa. She can only speak with her 
husband, not with anyone else. She can talk to women but not to any man. That is Allah’s 
miracle. [Men’s voices: Ya Allah! Ya rabi!] She is dumb. She can only talk to her 
husband, not to other man. You must all follow Allah. You have committed many sins. 
You must pray. Allah sent the prophet to guide you. Have you followed Allah’s way? 
Why do you fight each other? [Men cry, ‘Allah!’]  
You are full of sin. Look at Hayrinisa, she can’t talk to men. Now so many ghosts have 
accepted Islam, and what are you doing? Fighting? Making money? You can’t take it to 
the grave. You must look after your wife. Don’t let her go to the bazaar alone. Allah 
didn’t create you to make money. He created you to pray. Allah gave you a great chance 
bringing you to this place to change your lives. Cry some more. Cry more. Tell your sins 
to Allah. Allah created this day for us to meet [Ya Allah!] You will never see me again 
[men sobbing, ‘Bismillah, Ya Allah!’] Allah gave you eyes to see, ears to hear, faces to 
love each other, why are you doing stupid things? You can speak, walk, and use your 
brains. Fear your shoes! On the Day of Judgement they will bear witness to all the places 
you have been. Don’t argue with each other. Allah doesn’t like it. This is not the way of 
Islam. …  
 
Although her words provide a far less rational statement of ideology than the previous 
example, they evidently provide these young men with a powerful, cathartic experience of 
faith. This was the most widely shared audio link that we found, suggesting that items like 
this deserve to be taken as seriously as the more easily assimilated religious rationalism of the 
previous sermon. Examples like this impel us to pay attention to the affective power of the 
voice, and the particularities of the mediated voice. Schulz argues that speech and voice have 
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a special potential for mobilizing people’s agentive and affective faculties. Voice and speech 
are considered (by people in Mali) to “touch” listeners in a way that is physically experienced, 
and thereby to move individuals from an attitude of passivity to action (Schulz 2012). Such 
views attest to and are inseparable from the wider Islamic culture of orality, centred on 
recitation of the Qur’an (Nelson), and the virtues of listening (Hirschkind 2006). They also 
impel us to focus on the sound qualities of particular media forms: audio files shared on 
smartphone, just like the earlier popular audio forms of cassette tapes, are particularly good at 
transmitting charisma because they help focus attention on the voice. The typically poor 
sound quality of these audio files – recorded by individuals on their phones, uploaded and 
shared – means that they are also good at signifying authenticity, conveying the urgency and 
affective impact of a charged moment of experience, caught and frozen in time and shared.  
 
Another link, shared in May 2013, holds another emotionally charged audio file containing a 
‘letter to my mother’. This is an audio version of a much more professionally produced video 
that was also circulating amongst the Uyghur diaspora on various media platforms including 
Facebook and YouTube, and which we believe was made by Uyghurs abroad. It portrays a 
young Uyghur man writing to his mother to explain why he has joined the mujahidin. This 
audio file was shared by large numbers of young people within Xinjiang. The file features a 
young male voice, again heavy with reverb, speaking directly to his mother, followed by a 
simple but very musical ‘tune’ sung by the same young man. With its repeated falling riff and 
echoing voice providing a counterpoint, in melodic style it is linked to the transnational 
sound world of Islamic nasheed. It is unaccompanied – a solo male voice plus echo – so 
Islamically speaking ‘not music’, and religiously permissable.  
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Letter to my mother (Anamgha yezilghan xet)4  
Spoken: In order to fulfil my obligation to Allah to protect his religion, I have betrayed 
you by leaving you. I will probably be accepted and martyred, please forgive me, but I am 
sure we will meet in heaven. Dear mother of a mujahidin, you are not alone. So many 
mothers have now sent their sons to the front line and they are praying for us. Never feel 
regret. This is not a real separation. The real separation is the choice between heaven and 
hell. You made us men. To protect the dignity of our mothers and sisters, to kill the 
unbelievers, we choose this way. With this letter I ask for consent from the mothers who 
send their sons to jihad.  
Sung:  
 
If someone says you can live 100 years like a rabbit,  
I reply I am happy to live one day like a tiger.  
Please mother, understand your son is now a mujahid,  
I should be brave in spirit.  
The rocks and stones will be my blanket.  
As long as I live I will continue to do jihad.  
Pray to Allah for us.  
I will be happy to die on the battlefield as a mujahid.  
Maybe some day you will hear a quiet voice.  
If that voice says your son has died,  
Mother, then your son is living joyfully in heaven.  
Never doubt that the martyrs  
Will find joy in heaven. 
                                                          
4 The audio file can be accessed here: 
http://www.soundislamchina.org/av/Anamgha_yezilghan_xet.mp3. 
 16 
 
Such examples demonstrate that transnational ‘jihad culture’ is being translated and 
distributed on Uyghur social networks. Traditional nasheed – sung poetry praising Allah – 
have a long history, and established recording industries across the Middle East and South 
East Asia cater to a significant sub-culture who consume them (Pieslak 2009; Rasmussen 
2010). The sub-genre of political or ‘jihadi’ nasheed can be traced back to the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, a period of violent struggle between Islamists and governments in Syria and 
Egypt. The Islamists in Egypt criticized the mainstream media for its immoral content and 
depicted it as part of a campaign against Islam, and nasheed formed an important aspect of 
the their cultural counter-offensive (Said 2012: 865). A pamphlet titled “44 Ways to Support 
Jihad”, written by the Islamist theorist Anwar al-Awlaqi, states: 
 
… A good Naschid can spread so widely it can reach to an audience that you could not 
reach through a lecture or a book. Naschids are especially inspiring to the youth, who are 
the foundation of Jihad in every age and time. Naschids are an important element in 
creating a “Jihad culture.” (translated in Said 2012: 863) 
 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, considered as one of the leading “poets of the Islamic da’wa”, published 
a book on music and Islam in 2001. In it he distinguishes between secular and religious 
singing and considers nasheed permissable because they encourage “the decidedness of the 
heroes for Jihad and war and incite to cohesiveness towards the martyrdom” (Said 2012: 870). 
 
Such nasheed are also commonly used as soundtracks for videos produced by Hamas, Fateh 
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and Hizbolla in the context of the Palestinian struggle. They are also used by ISIL in videos 
which depict ISIL victories in battle or the killing of hostages (Pieslak 2009). It is noteworthy 
that the video accompanying this nasheed, which circulated Uyghur diasporic online 
networks in 2012-13, instead depicts Chinese state violence against Uyghurs, featuring 
footage of the 2009 riots and subsequent police crackdown. In terms of performance style, 
this Uyghur recording is closest in to the audio recordings of sung poetry called tarana which 
have been circulated by the Taliban since the 1990s (Baily 2001), first by cassette and more 
recently by smartphones, and used to glorify the mujahidin and promote the necessity for 
jihad. Thomas Johnson notes how Taliban tarana draw on and manipulate cultural identifiers, 
historical memories and familiar icons to present their message to target audiences. Their 
repetitive musical refrains drive home these forms of cultural intimacy with affective force 
(Johnson 2011: 26-7). 
 
State response 
By early August 2014, most of the profiled individuals were sharing messages about the new 
security crackdown on social media. This crackdown included – in rural areas but not in 
Urumchi – regular checks of people’s smartphones as they passed through police checkpoints. 
It is striking given the presumed high-tech capabilities of the Chinese state, that the 
crackdown took this most primitive, hands-on form. ‘D’ posted on her circle a warning of the 
danger of arrest if the police discovered an illegal app on your phone, and helpfully provided 
a list of illegal apps. ‘Please spread this message’, she wrote, ‘and avoid trouble for 
yourselves’. Another young man (B), an IT worker from the rural south, posted this message 
in August 2014, and like many other smartphone users, deleted all the Islamic media from his 
profile in response to the crackdown. 
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All friends and colleagues please read:  
If any of you have Islamic words or images on your WeChat profile, please forgive me 
if I remove you from my friendship list. I am currently having a lot of problems. I travel 
a lot, and I am constantly being checked (tekshurlimen). I don’t want to cause trouble 
for you. 
 
Conclusions 
Of course, WeChat is not the problem. The religious ideologies spread by smartphone are not 
the cause of social and religious change in Uyghur society, but are a symptom of these 
changes. This highly flexible form of social media enabled a brief window in time when we 
were able to sit outside Xinjiang and listen in on very open conversations about life, religion 
and politics, giving us a unique snapshot of the changing face of Islam in Uyghur society. 
The crackdown will not stop these conversations but can only shift them into a different 
forum.  
 
In terms of religious and ideological stance the material that we have surveyed on We Chat is 
diverse, revealing a range of different religious sensibilities. This runs from the overtly 
nationalist, intellectual style of political Islam, linking the failure of the Uyghur nation to 
follow ‘correct’ forms of Islam to their oppression by a Communist regime. This contrasts 
with the miracle-laden, emotive discourse of a folk preacher who promotes piety and 
especially women’s modesty; and finally a sung nasheed, which seeks to create a powerful, 
intimate empathetic bond between the listener and an imagined mujahidin. It is not 
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appropriate to label the whole of this diverse discourse as extremist Islamist propaganda that 
has infiltrated from abroad. As Johan Rasanayagum argues in his introduction to a special 
issue on Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of 
interpretation within a particular society, as well as taking account of the linkages between 
local Muslims and ideas and trends circulating outside the local context. Islam should be 
understood as a discursive tradition that seeks to define the correct form and meaning of 
religious practice, and scholars should focus on the processes and struggles through which 
local actors themselves attempt to define what constitutes true Islam and a good Muslim 
(Rasanayagum 2006: 225). 
 
Clearly this material is coming from multiple sources. Much of it is entirely apolitical, and 
most of it is locally produced. Almost all of the material is produced by Uyghurs for Uyghurs, 
and it directly references local concerns. There are a few references to Muslims in other parts 
of the world by the more highly educated, cosmopolitan individuals – to Gaza, to the UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2014 Ramadan address, an Islamic song by a well-known 
Arab singer – but for the most part the focus is inwards. The most radical, most oppositional 
items are being shared by the youngest and least well-educated individual in our sample, ie 
the most marginalised, the one with least to lose.  
 
It is crucial to consider what makes this kind of material so popular, and why it was 
circulating so widely. By listening to and sharing these media items, people experience a 
form of cultural intimacy in powerfully affective ways. The listening experience is at once 
personal, intimate and secret, and also public, collectively shared. Together they produce is a 
sense of crisis – one personally and collectively experienced – to which Islam, in different 
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forms, provides a solution through personal and collective transformation. A common theme 
running through much of the material relates Islam to the question of national survival. 
Repeatedly we find the twin arguments that only by becoming true Muslims can Uyghurs 
withstand oppressive and assimilative rule, and only by becoming true Muslims can Uyghurs 
counter damaging tendencies in society like drug abuse, alcoholism, fraud and prostitution, 
since these immoral acts that spring from living in a non-Muslim society. 
 
Secondly, there is ample evidence in the material surveyed to suggest that the current 
crackdown on religious extremism, with the imposition of a range of tight restrictions on 
normal religious practice including prayer, teaching, and fasting, and through the current high 
levels of surveillance, harassment and frequent recourse to violence by the police, far from 
addressing the root causes of the spread of radical Islam, is increasing the sense of injustice 
and discrimination experienced by many Uyghurs, thus exacerbating the problem it purports 
to solve. In this way, the region has entered a cycle of escalating violence and increasing 
religiosity from which it may be hard to extricate. 
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